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I. BY EXCLUDING RELEVANT EVIDENCE, THE PARTIES WERE 
ASSURED OF FINDINGS THAT WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE AND, THEREFORE, CLEARLY ERRONEOUS . 
It is evident from the Appellee's brief that he wants things both ways: In 
other words, admission of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the 
unambiguous terms of the parties' contract regarding "subject matter," but 
exclusion of the same evidence when it comes to "price." There is no way to 
square this approach, and this is the problem with the trial court's ruling. 
The REPC was a form contract that has been used without exception in this 
State for many years. If it was unambiguous on the subject of price, it was 
unambiguous on the subject matter. Flores never demonstrated how the language 
of the contract was ambiguous, but only when applied to the circumstances of this 
case. 
We demonstrated that this is the province of contract "integration," not 
interpretation, and it is undisputed that the parties' contract was fully integrated.1 
Therefore, the parties' subjective "intent" could not be the proper subject of the 
1
 Though it is not correct to say, as did Flores that "the Trial Court found that the REPC was folly integrated." (Pg. 
7, Brief of Appellee) We demonstrated the trial court's finding that the REPC was only "partially" integrated. (R. 
101) We also explained how this was the source of the trial court's erroneous ruling on contract interpretation. 
(Arguments, Section I, Brief of Appellant) 
trial court's analysis. See WebBankv. American General Annuity Service Corp., 
2002 UT 88,1J121, 26-26, 54 P.3d 1139 
If the contract was unambiguous, the trial court should not have admitted 
any extrinsic evidence. However, if it was ambiguous, the trial court erred in 
excluding relevant evidence that bore on the alleged ambiguity {i.e., the price for 
which the built-out condominium was to be sold). 
If the goal was to reach the parties' "intent," it was wrong for the trial court 
to consider some but not all the evidence bearing on the subject. What we are left 
with is nothing resembling the parties' agreement. 
There is no authority for the trial court's approach to this matter. Flores has 
certainly offered none. He refers this Court (pg. 8, Brief of Appellee) to his Post-
Trial Memorandum, re: Extrinsic Evidence. (R. 82) (Addendum A, Brief of 
Appellee) However, there is nothing in that memorandum addressing this specific 
question. 
In this regard, it is important to note that the trial court did not "find" the 
facts in Flores' favor. It simply found them to be sufficiently "reasonable" (R. 
101) to support a determination that the contract was ambiguous. Peterson v. 
Sunrider Corp, 2002 UT 43, fl9, 48 P.3d 918 This serves to show what the trial 
2 
court was thinking: Exclude extrinsic evidence where it conflicted with the trial 
court's flawed legal reasoning regarding ambiguousness. 
Therefore, this is not your typical case where the losing party objects to the 
trial court's weighing of conflicting evidence (though there is an aspect of that in 
this appeal). By purposefully excluding relevant extrinsic evidence from the 
determination of the parties' "intent," the parties were assured of findings that 
were not supported by the evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous. 
In this regard, it is also important to note that Flores has taken no exception 
to Eamshaw's marshalling of the evidence supporting the trial court judgment.2 
Even more significant, Flores has taken no exception with Earnshaw's marshalling 
of the evidence that the trial court refused to consider. (Pp. 8-12, Brief of 
Appellant) 
It requires no weighing of the evidence to see how different the findings 
may have been if this critical evidence had been considered. For this reason, we 
are confident that the evidence, even when viewed in a light most favorable to the 
district court, is legally insufficient to support the trial court's findings. In re 
Sonnenreich, 2004 UT 3,1J45 n.14, 86 P.3d 712 
2
 "Defendant does properly recite facts from the record (beginning on page 8 of his Brief) in support of his claim 
that the findings of the Court.. .were not supported by the evidence...." (Pg. 3, Brief of Appellee) 
3 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court judgment was wrong on both counts: The REPC was not 
ambiguous, and it was error to admit extrinsic evidence that altered or varied its 
express terms. If the REPC was ambiguous, it was error to exclude relevant 
extrinsic evidence because it resulted in findings that were not supported by the 
evidence and, therefore, clearly erroneous. 
For the foregoing, additional reasons, the trial court's Memorandum 
Decision (R. 095) should be REVERSED and the Order and Judgment (R. 139) 
VACATED. 
DATED this ^ ^ day of October, 2008. 
DALTON & KELLEY, PLC 
By V f l A J i ^ L ^ J H K -
Donald L. Dalton 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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